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HOLD THE MAYO: WHY STRONG DEFERENCE TO 
TREASURY REGULATIONS MIGHT NOT BE HEALTHY 
GRANT MARSHALL* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is.”1  However, in some respects, the judicial department has 
surrendered its interpretive powers to agencies tasked with interpreting 
Congressional statutes.2  Courts have long deferred to governmental agency and 
department rules and regulations.3  In the landmark case Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court promulgated the current 
standard for court deference.4  Until recently, courts have given IRS treasury 
regulations less deference than the regulations of other governmental agencies.5  
However, since the recent Supreme Court case Mayo Foundation for Medical Education 
& Research v. United States, courts must now use the more deferential Chevron 
standard.6  But is a heightened level of deference to the IRS sound public policy?  
Part II of this article discusses Chevron and Mayo and the multiple deference standards 
set forth by the Supreme Court.  Part III provides an overview of biases and 
heuristics in individuals, firms, and governmental agencies, as well as how these 
biases and heuristics affect the IRS in the drafting of regulations.  Part IV discusses 
the policy implications behind these findings.  Part V concludes. 
 
                                                            
* J.D., University of Tennessee College of Law. 
1 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
2 See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 188-89 (2006). 
3 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
4 Id. at 843-44. 
5 See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 712-13 (2011). 
6 Id. at 713-14. 
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II. CHEVRON DEFERENCE AND MAYO 
The Chevron holding sets forth the current standard of deference courts must 
give to governmental agencies.  The Chevron Court’s analysis begins as follows: 
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it 
administers, it is confronted with two questions.  First, always, is the 
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue. . . . [I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the 
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.7 
An agency’s interpretation of a statute is given controlling weight unless it is 
“arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”8  A court may not 
substitute its own construction of a statute if the agency’s interpretation is a 
reasonable one.9  The Court further stated that “considerable weight” should be 
given to agencies in these circumstances.10 
 As an example, the Court in Mayo applied the Chevron standard to determine 
whether certain treasury regulations were valid.11  The issue in Mayo was “whether 
doctors who serve as medical residents are properly viewed as ‘student[s]’ whose 
service Congress has exempted from [Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA)] 
taxes under 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(10).”12  Inundated with claims, the Treasury 
Department had adopted a rule stating that an employee’s service is “incident” to his 
studies only if the educational aspect between the employee and employer is 
predominant to the service aspect.13  The treasury regulation categorically states that 
a full time employee—one normally scheduled to work forty hours or more per 
                                                            
7 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.  The Court further noted that the reading court need not agree with the 
agency’s reading of the statute; it must only find the construction permissible.  See id. at 843 n.11. 
8 Id. at 844; see also United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 834 (1984); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 
U.S. 34, 44 (1981); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 426 (1977); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United 
States, 299 U.S. 232, 236-37 (1936). 
9 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
10 See id. 
11 See Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 711. 
12 Id. at 708 (first alteration in original). 
13 Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d)(3)(i). 
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week—is not providing services incident to his or her course of study.14  First, the 
Mayo Court applied Chevron step one, asking whether Congress directly addressed the 
definition of a “student” under FICA or whether the statute applies to medical 
residents.15  The Court found no indication that Congress intended to include 
medical residents in FICA, so the Court continued to Chevron step two,16 asking 
whether the rule is “‘arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to 
the statute.’”17  The Court found that the regulation easily satisfied Chevron step two 
because the Treasury Department’s rule was a “‘reasonable interpretation’” of 
FICA.18 
However, the standard of deference given to the IRS has not always been so 
clear.19  Justice Roberts noted in his majority opinion in Mayo that, since the Supreme 
Court decided Chevron in 1984, it has cited both National Muffler and Chevron regarding 
IRS regulations.20  The National Muffler standard of deference, articulated in a 1979 
decision, states: 
In determining whether a particular regulation carries out the 
congressional mandate in a proper manner, we look to see whether 
the regulation harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its 
                                                            
14 See Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d)(3)(iii); see also Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(e) (Example 4) 
(stating that, because an employee’s “normal work schedule” calls for the employee to work more 
than 40 hours per week, the employee’s services are “not incident to and for the purpose of pursuing 
a course of study”). 
15 See Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 711. 
16 See id. 
17 Id. (quoting Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 242 (2004)). 
18 See id. at 714-15 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984)).  The Court found that “[f]ocusing on the hours an individual works and the hours he spends 
in studies is a perfectly sensible way of accomplishing that goal.”  Id. at 715. 
19 See Mark E. Berg, Judicial Deference to Tax Regulations: A Reconsideration in Light of National Cable, 
Swallows Holding, and Other Developments, 61 TAX LAW. 481, 490-91 (2008) (describing the multiple 
standards of deference courts use while ruling on Treasury Department regulations). 
20 Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 712 (“Since deciding Chevron, [the Court has] cited both National Muffler and 
Chevron in [its] review of Treasury Department regulations.”) (citing United States v. Cleveland Indians 
Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 219 (2001) (citing National Muffler); Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 523 U.S. 
382, 387, 389 (1998) (citing Chevron and Cottage Savings); Cottage Savs. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 
560-61 (1991) (citing National Muffler); United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 246 n.4 (1985) (citing 
Chevron)). 
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origin, and its purpose.  A regulation may have particular force if it is 
a substantially contemporaneous construction of the statute by those 
presumed to have been aware of congressional intent.  If the 
regulation dates from a later period, the manner in which it evolved 
merits inquiry.  Other relevant considerations are the length of time 
the regulation has been in effect, the reliance placed on it, the 
consistency of the Commissioner’s interpretation, and the degree of 
scrutiny Congress has devoted to the regulation during subsequent 
re-enactments of the statute.21 
The Court further stated that “[t]he choice among reasonable interpretations is for 
the Commissioner, not the courts”22 and that the regulation “merits serious 
deference.”23 
 After Chevron, the Supreme Court again, in 2001, added further confusion to 
the standard of deference debate in United States v. Mead Corp., where the Court 
allowed a high standard of deference when Congress had not addressed the exact 
issue.24  The Court also renewed the test from Skidmore v. Swift & Co.—a standard 
that examines factors such as “the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, 
formality, and relative expertness, and . . . the persuasiveness of the agency’s 
position.”25  Skidmore, unlike Chevron, allows the reviewing court to choose a different 
rule even if the regulation is a reasonable interpretation of the statute.26 
Prior to Mayo, different courts gave IRS regulations different standards of 
deference, including the Chevron standard,27 the National Muffler standard,28 the 
                                                            
21 Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979). 
22 Id. at 488. 
23 Id. at 484. 
24 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Irving Salem et al., ABA Section of Taxation 
Report of the Task Force on Judicial Deference, 57 TAX LAW. 717, 720 (2004) [hereinafter ABA Task Force 
Report]. 
25 Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944)) (citations 
omitted). 
26 ABA Task Force Report, supra note 24, at 720. 
27 See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text. 
28 See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. 
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reasonableness test—a standard where courts simply take the totality of factors and 
ask whether a certain Treasury Regulation is a reasonable reading of the statute,29 and 
the Skidmore standard.30  To add to the confusion, these standards have different 
meanings in different situations.31 
In Mayo, the main issue was which standard of deference the Supreme Court 
should apply.32  The district court in Mayo rejected the Treasury Regulation, citing the 
National Muffler standard.33  The Court implied that the Chevron standard is much 
more deferential than that of National Muffler, noting that “a court might view an 
agency’s interpretation of a statute with heightened skepticism when it has not been 
consistent over time, when it was promulgated years after the relevant statute was 
enacted, or because of the way in which the regulation evolved.”34  The Court further 
reasoned that it should not “carve out” a deferential standard that is only applicable 
to tax law; instead, judicial review of administration actions should be uniform.35  
The Court held that the principles underlying Chevron apply to Mayo, recognizing that 
“‘[t]he power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . . . 
program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill 
any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress’”36 and that filling gaps left by 
Congress necessarily requires the Treasury Department to interpret complex Internal 
Revenue Code statutes.37 
                                                            
29 See ABA Task Force Report, supra note 24, at 740.  The reasonableness test is very similar to the 
National Muffler standard, which is used to determine whether a regulation is reasonable. Id. 
30 Berg, supra note 19, at 490. 
31 Id. 
32 See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 711-14 (2011) 
(discussing whether National Muffler or Chevron deference applies to the Treasury Regulation at issue). 
33 Id. at 712. 
34 Id. (citing Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979)). 
35 Id. at 713. 
36 Id. (alteration and ellipsis in original) (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). 
37 Id.; see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596 (1983) (noting that, with the 
complexity of the tax system, the IRS should be able to “exercise its authority to meet changing 
conditions and new problems”). 
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Why do courts defer to agencies?  The primary reason for deference is the 
fact that Congress generally gives authority to the Treasury Department to “prescribe 
all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of [the Internal Revenue Code], 
including all rules and regulations as may be necessary.”38  However, the Code does 
not establish the level of deference a court must give to the Treasury Department.  
One principle of administrative law is that “[a]dministrative efficiency is 
increased by . . . specialization.”39  Furthermore, administrative law is focused on 
“getting things done.”40  Judicial deference accomplishes this goal because Treasury 
Regulations are inherently quicker and easier to enact and apply without constant 
interruption from the judiciary.  Without deference, regulations would always be 
pending in the courts and things would not “get done” as quickly or efficiently. 
Furthermore, “[s]cholarship about judicial review of agency regulation, like 
administrative law scholarship generally, has proceeded by assuming, either implicitly 
or explicitly, that the agency and its staff act rationally.”41  Judge Posner himself has 
championed the rationality of individuals.42  After all, administrative law generally 
ignores what happens inside an agency.43  Scholars generally treat agencies as rational 
decisionmakers.44  Perhaps because administrative law views agencies as rational 
decisionmakers, courts must defer to their regulations.  This may be problematic 
because rationality may be applied to both individuals and organizations.45  Yet, the 
misconception that human beings are always rational, which has permeated utilitarian 
                                                            
38 I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2011). 
39 HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN 
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 20 (1976). 
40 Id. at 1. 
41 Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 
CORNELL L. REV. 486, 489 (2002). 
42 Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption 
from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1061 (2000) (“[A]s Richard Posner has written, ‘man is a 
rational maximizer of his ends.’”) (quoting Richard A. Posner, Are We One Self or Multiple Selves?: 
Implications for Law and Public Policy, 3 LEGAL THEORY 23, 24 (1997)). 
43 Seidenfeld, supra note 41, at 487.  Seidenfeld compares administrative treatment of agencies to a 
black box.  Id. (citing RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS (3d ed. 
1999)). 
44 Id. at 488.  Seidenfeld notes two exceptions: groupthink and boundedly rational decisionmaking.  Id. 
45 See SIMON, supra note 39, at 76-77. 
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political philosophy, has long been “decisively refuted by modern developments in 
psychology and sociology.”46  In fact, “[i]t is impossible for the behavior of a single, 
isolated individual to reach any high degree of rationality.”47  However, when an 
organization brings together individuals and trains and informs those individuals, 
they begin to near objective rationality.48 
III. BIASES AND HEURISTICS 
 Individuals do not always act as economists assume—that is, to maximize 
utility by weighing the costs and benefits of a particular choice.49  In reality, 
decisionmakers make cognitive errors that can lead to often predictable biases.50  As 
first noted by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, individuals are susceptible to 
biases stemming from judgmental heuristics.51  When faced with complicated 
decisions or judgments, people often rely on heuristics, or “general rules of thumb,” 
to reduce the amount of time and effort necessary to make reasonably good 
decisions.52  While these heuristics generally lead to fairly good estimates, they may 
also lead to systematic biases.53  “[E]veryone is exposed”54—reliance on heuristics is 
not only limited to laymen.55  Furthermore, “individual judgment and choice is often 
driven by heuristic-based reasoning as opposed to the pure optimization approach 
                                                            
46 Id. at 61-62. 
47 Id. at 79. 
48 Id. at 80. 
49 Seidenfeld, supra note 41, at 491. 
50 Id. at 492. 
51 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 
1124, 1130 (1974).  For a general discussion on heuristics, see also SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 107, 109 (1993). 
52 PLOUS, supra note 51, at 109. 
53 Id.; see also Seidenfeld, supra note 41, at 494-95. 
54 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 51, at 1130. 
55 Id.  On the other hand, “the statistically sophisticated avoid elementary errors, such as the gambler’s 
fallacy.”  Id.  However, these experts nevertheless “are liable to similar fallacies in more intricate and 
less transparent problems.”  Id. 
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presumed by rational choice theory.”56  In theory, an individual would make a cost-
benefit analysis and choose the option that would maximize utility.57  “In reality, 
individuals more often rely on simpler, heuristic reasoning to make both judgments 
about the world and decisions of how to act within that world.  Difficult questions . . 
. are dealt with by substituting answers to easier questions, . . . and difficult decisions 
. . . are resolved by making easier choices.”58  It should be noted that although these 
heuristics may lead to irrational, non-profit maximizing choices, they are necessary 
because, if all of our “decisions were made only after constructing a regression model 
containing all relevant data, none of us could complete the myriad cognitive 
processing tasks we face each day.”59 
One automatically and intuitively uses heuristics to make judgments quicker 
and with less effort.60  This is because “[i]ndividuals generally have neither the time 
to collect and analyze such information nor the capability of performing all the 
necessary comparisons that optimization entails.”61  This way of simplifying a 
cognitive task, known as “satisficing,” involves an individual looking for alternatives 
until reaching “a preset level of satisfaction.”62  However, heuristics, while essential 
to decision-making, can cause an individual to make choices irrationally by 
                                                            
56 Russell Korobkin, The Problems with Heuristics for Law 1 (UCLA School of Law, Law & Econ. 
Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 04-1, 2004), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=496462.  Rational choice theory assumes that 
individuals will process information and make choices that will maximize utility—i.e. to “maximize 
the differential between expected benefits and expected costs.”  Id. at 2. 
57 Id. at 2-3. 
58 Id. at 3. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 14 (citing Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution 
in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49 
(Gilovich et al. eds., 2002)).  For example, Korobkin relates heuristics with the classic anecdote where 
“a drunk look[s] for his lost keys under a lamp post because that is where the light is best.”  Id. 
61 Seidenfeld, supra note 41, at 492; cf. Korobkin, supra note 56, at 3. 
62 Seidenfeld, supra note 41, at 492.  See generally Jonathan Brodie Bendor et al., Satisficing: A ‘Pretty 
Good’ Heuristic, 9 B.E. J. THEORETICAL ECON., Iss. 1, Art. 9 (2009) (proposing a mathematical model 
of satisficing). 
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prompting the individual to overvalue or undervalue information related to that 
choice.63 
In addition to citizens, lawmakers and policymakers show reliance on 
heuristics.64  A problem arises “when lawmakers attempt to make decisions for the 
collective that maximize social utility . . . because the decisions of lawmakers might 
not be optimal given available information.”65  Regulators who rely on heuristics tend 
to misestimate or ignore costs and benefits when reaching decisions, resulting in 
regulators failing to create optimal incentives.66 
Furthermore, regulators may engage in groupthink, “‘a mode of thinking that 
people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the 
members’ striving for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise 
alternative courses of action.’”67  One particularly relevant antecedent condition is 
negative decision framing.68  For example, consider a firm that made $10 million last 
year but will only make $1 million this year.69  According to prospect theory, the firm 
and its employees may perceive this as a loss of $9 million.70  The IRS may be 
affected by prospect theory in a similar respect.  If the revenue from the IRS was $28 
billion in 2011, but the IRS estimated future revenue at only $25 billion, it might see 
the difference as a loss of $3 billion and regulate accordingly to increase revenue.  
Concurrence seeking is another groupthink heuristic that might cause problems in 
the IRS.71  The danger in concurrence seeking “is not that people will be reluctant to 
disagree with the majority because they are motivated to preserve group unity, but 
                                                            
63 See Korobkin, supra note 56, at 3. 
64 Id. at 4. 
65 Id. 
66 See id. at 9-10. 
67 Glen Whyte, Recasting Janis’s Groupthink Model: The Key Role of Collective Efficacy in Decision Fiascoes, 73 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 185, 185-86 (1998) (quoting IRVING 
LESTER JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 9 
(Houghton Mifflin 1982)). 
68 Id. at 193. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. (citing Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decisions Under Risk, 47 
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979)). 
71 See id. at 196. 
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that people will be reluctant to challenge the policy favored by the majority or the 
leader because they believe the policy to be a good one.”72 
Decision making can also be sidetracked by both interest group biases73 and 
cognitive biases.74  Professors Eskridge, Jr. and Ferejohn provide an excellent 
summary of the cognitive biases associated with groups of individuals.75  Explaining 
one potential mental mistake of groups, “[a] committee might overgeneralize from 
dramatic and emotionally striking events (the availability heuristic) or from small 
unrepresentative samples (the representativeness heuristic).”76  For example, a person 
might “assess the risk of heart attack among middle-aged people by recalling such 
occurrences among one’s acquaintances.”77  While availability is useful for 
determining probability or frequency, it is also affected by factors other than 
probability or frequency.78  Another concern is that “[a] committee might anchor its 
decisionmaking on an arbitrary starting point and filter factual evidence through the 
lens of that bias (anchoring or cognitive dissonance).”79  For example, experts 
severely underestimate the time it takes for a novice to complete a task because the 
experts more easily recall their experiences as experts, where completing the task 
                                                            
72 Id. 
73 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Structuring Lawmaking to Reduce Cognitive Bias: A Critical 
View, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 616, 616 (2002) (“[S]elfish interest groups and public officials highjack the 
governmental process for their private gain, thereby undermining the public interest in efficient rules 
and distributions.”). 
74 Id. at 621 (“For example, a committee tackling the issue of global warming can reach disastrously 
wrong conclusions not just by pandering to the interests of industrial polluters (the public choice 
problem), but also by making simple but predictable mistakes in reasoning (the cognitive psychology 
problem).”). 
75 See generally id. at 621-23 (summarizing different cognitive biases). 
76 Id. at 621 (citations omitted); accord Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by 
Representativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 84-85 (Daniel 
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (noting that people tend to expect sample sizes “to be highly 
representative of their parent populations”). 
77 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 51, at 1127. 
78 Id. 
79 Eskridge, Jr. & Ferejohn, supra note 73, at 622. 
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took less time.80  Expertise can actually increase the underestimation bias and can 
become more resistant to debiasing.81  Another common heuristic largely connected 
with groups or associations is that they “might impute [their] members’ own views 
and preferences to everyone else, an assumption that reflects lack of empathy or 
understanding of others’ different situations (the egocentrism bias).”82  For example, 
experts might be unable to see another’s perspective, thus attributing to others the 
expert’s own knowledge or viewpoint.83 
Another common committee heuristic is that they might “tend to defer to 
experts (the expert-deference bias, also hypervigilance) who themselves tend to be 
overconfident about their conclusions (the overconfidence bias).”84  That is, even if 
the committee itself is not comprised of experts who exhibit the bias, the committee 
will defer to those who tend to exhibit the overconfidence bias.85  A committee 
problem that may be especially problematic with the IRS is that:  
[i]f the committee is composed of like-thinking persons, deliberation 
might tend to skew the committee’s conclusions toward positions 
more extreme than those with which the members started (the 
polarization effect). . . . [T]here is a danger that committee members 
will go along with a proposal only because they think ‘everyone 
thinks this way’ (the cascade effect).86 
For example, when like-minded individuals “meet regularly, without sustained 
exposure to competing views[,] extreme movements are all the more likely,”87 often 
                                                            
80 See Pamela J. Hinds, The Curse of Expertise: The Effects of Expertise and Debiasing Methods on Predictions of 
Novice Performance, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL: APPLIED 205, 217 (1999). 
81 Id. 
82 Eskridge, Jr. & Ferejohn, supra note 73, at 622. 
83 Raymond S. Nickerson, How We Know—and Sometimes Misjudge—What Others Know: Imputing One’s 
Own Knowledge to Others, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 737, 738 (1999). 
84 Eskridge, Jr. & Ferejohn, supra note 73, at 622 (citations omitted). 
85 See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text. 
86 Eskridge, Jr. & Ferejohn, supra note 73, at 622; accord Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why 
Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 74 (2000). 
87 Sunstein, supra note 86, at 75.  
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resulting in riskier choices.88  Finally, “[i]f the problem is complex, the committee 
may be overwhelmed and paralyzed (information overload) or driven away from 
correct but extreme positions (the dilution effect) by considering too much 
information, and may consequently be unduly deferential to other decisionmakers.”89 
An important question remains: whether individuals are more prone to biases 
than firms and governmental agencies.  Judge Cardozo recognized the problem of 
bias by judges and sought to acknowledge these biases that often rule decision 
making.90  Most cognitive bias literature focuses on individual decisional biases.91  
While individual biases are important, the individual biases that most influence 
decision making may have less of an effect on group decision making.92  “Although 
expertise and the group nature of agency decisionmaking can alleviate many such 
biases, it can also amplify some biases.”93 
The IRS is a super-technical, legal entity.  Thus, are its lawyers subjected to 
motivated reasoning, biases, and heuristics?  Although the IRS is an agency and, 
compared to individuals, is generally less affected by biases and heuristics,94 those 
writing the regulations have predominately similar backgrounds as tax lawyers.95  
While some groups, firms, or agencies might employ individuals from all disciplines 
and backgrounds, the IRS Chief Counsel is generally comprised of like-minded 
lawyers, possibly minimizing the effect that the group has on reducing bias among 
the individual attorneys.  Decision making reflects the professional education of 
                                                            
88 DONALD G. ELLIS & B. AUBREY FISHER, SMALL GROUP DECISION MAKING: COMMUNICATION 
AND THE GROUP PROCESS 42 (1974). 
89 Eskridge, Jr. & Ferejohn, supra note 73, at 622-23 (citations omitted); see also Philip E. Tetlock & 
Richard Boettger, Accountability: A Social Magnifier of the Dilution Effect, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 388, 396 (1989) (an empirical analysis on the dilution effect). 
90 Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for the People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth 
Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 152 (2008). 
91 Eskridge, Jr. & Ferejohn, supra note 73, at 620. 
92 Id. at 620-21.   
93 Seidenfeld, supra note 41, at 492. 
94 See id. at 492-93. 
95 See John F. Coverdale, Chevron’s Reduced Domain: Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations and Revenue 
Rulings after Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 39, 65 (2003) (discussing the procedure by which IRS attorneys 
draft regulations).  
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individuals,96 and lawyers are trained to serve the best interests of their clients, often 
regardless of what other individuals might think.97  In Revenue Procedure 64-22, the 
IRS provides general guidance for its staff: 
At the heart of administration is interpretation of the Code.  It is the 
responsibility of each person in the Service, charged with the duty of 
interpreting the law, to try to find the true meaning of the statutory 
provision and not to adopt a strained construction in the belief that 
he is “protecting the revenue.”  The revenue is properly protected 
only when we ascertain and apply the true meaning of the statute.98 
Revenue Procedure 64-22 indicates that the IRS’s primary function is to ensure the 
efficient operation of the tax system; that function is best served in a fair and 
balanced manner that focuses on self-assessment.99 
 Because the IRS is comprised of experts, it is important to note which biases 
expertise is likely to exacerbate.  One such bias is the egocentrism bias.100  
Egocentrism is “an inability to take another’s perspective, which is tantamount to 
assuming that another’s perspective is precisely one’s own.”101  This bias occurs 
because individuals tend to attribute their own knowledge to others.102 
Congress knows that the IRS is affected by biases and heuristics, but, as 
Justice Scalia notes, “Congress . . . knows that the ambiguities it creates . . . will be 
resolved, within the bounds of permissible interpretation, not by the courts but by a 
particular agency, whose policy biases will ordinarily be known.”103  Justice Scalia 
brings up an interesting point: Congress knows the biases of the IRS and can plan 
                                                            
96 See Seidenfeld, supra note 41, at 493. 
97 JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 61 
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accordingly. However, Congress cannot know the possible biases of a particular 
judge that might hear a case relating to ambiguity in a code section,104 and 
consequently it cannot prepare accordingly. 
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 Regulatory and budgetary decisions made by the Treasury Department 
function as collective choices on behalf of the citizens of the country.  Traditional 
theory supports the argument that these choices should be made based on a 
comparison between the costs and benefits of these respective choices to society as a 
whole or to a particular group.105  Because heuristics can lead to biasing Treasury 
Regulations, the IRS might fail to provide for ultimately optimal choices or 
incentives.106  Therefore, public policy would benefit from debiasing mechanisms 
that decrease the IRS’s reliance on heuristics, enabling increased analysis by the use 
of cost and benefit calculations. 
A. Less Deference 
Clearly an unbiased regulatory agency makes decisions that maximize utility 
more so than one affected by biases and heuristics.107  Since individuals act on biases 
and heuristics, should courts defer to IRS regulations?  One policy approach 
designed to combat biases and heuristics affecting Treasury Regulations would be to 
give less deference to them.  The benefits are twofold.  First, giving less deference to 
the IRS would incentivize the IRS to self-regulate or self-debias, because it would 
likely be under much more scrutiny.  Secondly, if courts give less deference to the 
Treasury Department’s regulations, the court system will then have more 
opportunity to cleanse from the body of law biased regulations drafted by Treasury 
Department agents who are affected by heuristics and motivated reasoning.  On the 
other hand, judges would also have more leeway to interpret Congress’ tax code 
however they see fit, and, as Judge Cardozo pointed out, judges are influenced by 
                                                            
104 The IRS cannot predict which code sections will be litigated against, nor which judge years from 
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105 See Korobkin, supra note 56, at 9. 
106 See id. at 10. 
107 See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 73, at 621-23. 
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biases too.108  Judicial reasoning can also produce suboptimal results because of 
heuristics.109 
The drawback with less deference given to agencies is fairly obvious.  The 
IRS regulates the Internal Revenue Code—a highly technical subject matter—and 
the IRS hires highly specialized attorneys to draft these regulations.  It seems logical 
that courts should defer to such expertise and training because, while individual 
members of the IRS might be more biased by political pressures or revenue creation, 
as a whole the IRS is in a position to curb heuristics and perform extraordinarily in-
depth cost-benefit analyses that judges practically cannot.  If courts do not defer to 
the IRS, judges must interpret the Internal Revenue Code.  A judge would then be 
faced with a very difficult task and might be bounded rationally by using heuristics to 
find a quick solution. 
B. Debiasing Mechanisms 
 There are readily known fixes for heuristic biases.  For example, suppose an 
individual overestimates the frequency of an occurrence because that event is salient 
and easily comes to mind.110  One solution is to keep track of the events and research 
the number of occurrences.111  Keeping statistics can reduce the impact of biases and 
heuristics because one relies less on beliefs and more on actual, confirmed data.112  
Furthermore, one can structure the decision making process “to alleviate entire 
typologies of errors . . . reduc[ing] bias without creating new biases.”113 
Currently, the IRS has little incentive to constrain its biases because the 
courts have awarded it a high standard of deference.  As long as the IRS’s 
construction of a statute is “permissible,” courts must defer.114  Thus, sound public 
                                                            
108 See supra note 90 and accompanying text; see also Korobkin, supra note 56, at 11 (“[J]udges, like lay 
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policy supports incorporating some kind of debiasing mechanism to quell biased 
regulations.  One such debiasing mechanism could be for Congress to “require 
regulators to conduct an explicit cost-benefit analysis of proposals and authorize 
judicial review of agency actions to insure that they are based on rational 
deliberation.”115  Because heuristic biases are predictable, there are often decision 
making techniques that can help to avoid biased judgments.116  However, Eskridge, 
Jr. and Ferejohn question the predictability and simplicity of biases because 
“cognitive biases have grown like weeds in a vacant lot” and have multiplied, making 
it “harder to reach conclusions from them.”117  Furthermore, they question the “basis 
for understanding how the different biases interact with one another.”118 
In studies on prediction, the accuracy of actuarial predictions, which are 
based on empirical relations between variables and an outcome, is equal to or better 
than clinical predictions, which are based on the judgment of humans.119  Predictions 
are more accurate when humans do not make the decisions even if the human has 
full access to actuarial information.120  Thus, agencies of the IRS could employ 
computers as a debiasing mechanism in this regard.  Instead of relying on the beliefs 
of agents, the IRS could pursue more effective and unbiased means of 
information—not just predictions. 
As Professor Kunda noted, the IRS could implement debiasing mechanisms 
such as using motivated reasoning.121  There are two types of motivated reasoning: 
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those motivated to reach an accurate result and those motivated to reach a 
“particular, directional conclusion.”122  Research on accuracy-driven reasoning, one 
motivated reasoning device, suggests that people who are motivated to be accurate 
work harder to reach that result.123  Evidence suggests that “manipulations designed 
to increase accuracy motives lead to an elimination or reduction of cognitive 
biases.”124  Therefore, if individuals “expected to justify their judgments, expected 
their judgments to be made public, or expected their evaluations to affect [a] 
person’s life,” then those individuals are less prone to engage in heuristic and biased 
probability judgments.125  Furthermore, accuracy-motivated persons tend to make 
decisions or judgments that are less extreme or risky.126  All else being equal, persons 
motivated to be accurate are generally more accurate than others.127  The IRS should 
take advantage of motivated reasoning when interpreting statutes to make 
regulations as close to the meaning and as fair to the statute as possible.  For 
example, if a drafter of a regulation must explain the theory behind the regulation 
and its purpose to other members of the IRS and to outsiders who wish to know 
about the new regulation, under Kunda’s theory, that drafter would be more 
motivated to reach an accurate, fair result than if the person simply had to write a 
piece of regulation.128 
On the other hand, perhaps the IRS itself creates an atmosphere 
incentivizing accuracy related motivated-reasoning.  While the current state of the 
law creates a disincentive for the IRS to debias, the state of the actual work 
environment creates significant incentives for IRS lawyers to debias themselves 
because there is a necessity to be accurate.129  The IRS might have an incentive to 
implement self-debiasing mechanisms because some employees in the IRS may wish 
to pursue a career at a private firm after their time at the IRS.  When the IRS 
publishes one-sided regulations, those outside the IRS will perceive that the IRS 
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interprets statutes in a biased manner,130 negatively affecting future job prospects for 
IRS attorneys.  Who wants to hire someone who is known to practice with biases 
and heuristics?  Therefore, the agents themselves will be accuracy-driven in 
regulations as opposed to being motivated toward arriving at a “pro-IRS” result.  
Additionally, if the IRS carries a stigma of employing biased agents and firms no 
longer hire lawyers with IRS experience as often as before, the IRS may have a 
difficult time finding skilled lawyers to work there in the first place.131  Thus, IRS 
officials higher up in the chain of command will be better served by ensuring that 
regulations remain accurate and not biased, thereby incentivizing accuracy 
motivation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 With Mayo and the Chevron standard in full force, will the IRS become bolder 
in its interpretation of Treasury Regulations?  This question is difficult to answer 
because “there is no objective metric for measuring how good a rule is.”132  Adding 
to the existing problems, in recent years, the IRS has attempted to increase its 
enforcement efforts aimed at abusive tax shelters; however, these efforts may end up 
affecting honest taxpayers instead of the intended targets.133  Taxpayers should be 
concerned that the IRS will “adopt one-sided interpretations of the law favoring the 
government.”134  Maybe the IRS is the ideal agency, is completely rational, and does 
not give in to heuristics.  However, as research shows, this is highly unlikely.  Courts 
should be aware of biases and heuristics that accompany agency regulation and act as 
the proper check to its biases.  While strong deference to the IRS might be effective 
in the short-run, the IRS may develop less incentive to check its own biases in the 
long-run without another branch of the U.S. Government—namely the Judiciary—
acting as a check to its now vast regulatory powers. 
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